THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AS EMPLOYEES:

A SUGGESTED

RESPONSE TO JUDICIAL LIMITATION

OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Anchorage Education Association v. Anchorage School District,I the Alaska Supreme Court considered whether the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA)2 granted the right to strike to public
school teachers. The court held that the statute granted no such
right, thus leaving teachers with no right to strike under either statutory or common law.3 The court held further that the legislature's
failure to grant this right to teachers while granting it or an alternative right to engage in compulsory interest arbitration 4 to other public employees did not violate equal protection.5
The decision in Anchorage EducationAssociation is not a substantial departure from the court's recent treatment of statutes defining the rights of teachers as public employees. The court has
consistently construed these statutes narrowly.6 The court enunciCopyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review
1. 648 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1982).
2. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.070-.260 (1981). The right to strike is found in
ALASKA STAT.

§ 23.40.200 (1981).

3. 648 P.2d at 996.
4. "Interest arbitration" involves "the determination of certain terms of a new
collective bargaining contract by an impartial third person" when the bargaining
parties reach impasse. Note, Impasse Resolution Mechanismsand Teacher Strikes, 7
U. MIcH-. J.L. REFORM 575, 581 (1974).
5. 648 P.2d at 996-97. The equal protection challenge was based on U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § I and ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
6. See, e.g., Rouse v. Anchorage School Dist., 613 P.2d 263, 264-66 (Alaska
1980) (salary benefits under collective bargaining agreement do not constitute a
"vested" right entitled to judicial protection); Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist.
v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416, 423 (Alaska 1977) (mandatory bargaining topics include only teachers' salaries, fringe benefits, the number of hours to
be worked, and the amount of leave time to be granted).
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ated yet another limitation on the collective bargaining rights of
teachers in Anchorage Education Association. The purpose of this

note is to examine the judicial limitations on teachers' rights and the
impact of those limitations on employer/employee relations. To this
end, the decision in Anchorage Education Association serves as the

focal point. It is scrutinized both for its own validity and for its implications in the larger context of employer/employee relations in
the public schools.
II.

SYNOPSIS OF ANCHORAGE EDUCATION ASSOCIATiON

.

ANCHORAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT

A. Facts and Procedural Posture of the Case
The Anchorage EducationAssociation case arose out of contract

negotiations between the association and the board of education.
The negotiations commenced in late 1978 and continued without
agreement until early September 1979. The parties' failure to consummate an agreement for the 1979-80 school year prompted the
teachers to strike on September 5, 1979. The teachers remained on
strike until September 10, when the superior court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO). The court enforced the TRO by issuing contempt citations and bench warrants for those teachers who
continued to strike.
The parties subsequently agreed to a settlement plan which permitted the association to seek a declaratory judgment on the issue of
the legality of teachers' strikes. The plan was included in the settlement order issued by the superior court. No further proceedings
were held and the teachers returned to their classrooms.
In spite of the resolution of the contract dispute, the association
did not adhere to the terms of the settlement and appealed the TRO
to the supreme court without seeking declaratory judgment of their
right to strike under PERA.7 Thus, the supreme court was unaided
by a lower court decision concerning the legality of the strike.
Summary of the Legal Issues Presented to and Resolved by
the Court
The case involved several related issues concerning the rights of
teachers as public employees. Although the primary issue before the
court was whether teachers have the right to strike under PERA, the
court also considered whether such a right exists under the common
B.

7. In light of the importance of the issues presented and in the interest of judicial economy, the court "decided to relax the normal rules and proceed to a consideration of the merits of [the] case, as though a declaratory judgment had been
entered." 648 P.2d at 994.
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law. Having resolved the right to strike issue against the teachers'
association under both statutory and common law, the court was
compelled to consider whether the legislature's failure to include
teachers in either the right to strike or the compulsory interest arbitration provisions of PERA violated the constitutional mandate of
equal protection of the laws. Specifically, the court considered
whether denying teachers a right to strike or to engage in complusory interest arbitration, while granting those rights to other public employees, bore a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate
legislative purpose.
-

Whether Teachers Enjoy a Right to Strike Under Statutory
or Common Law

Writing for the majority, Justice Connor first addressed the
question whether the right to strike granted by the legislature in
PERA8 extended to public school teachers. The statute states that
"public utility, snow removal, sanitation and public school and other
educational institution employees" are permitted to "engage in a
strike after mediation . . . for a limited time."9 This language,
standing alone, appears to grant teachers a limited right to strike.' 0
The majority did not end its scrutiny with the seemingly unequivocal language of the statute. Relying on the definitional section
of PERA which declares that a "public employee" is "any employee
of a public employer, whether or not in the classified service of the
public employer, except elected or appointed officials or teachers or
noncertificated employees of school districts,"'" the majority concluded that the statutory right of public employees to strike did not
extend to public school teachers.' 2 Quite simply, the court held that
teachers were not "public employees" for purposes of PERA.
The teachers contended that they must be included within the
right to strike provision, lest the language of the statute be rendered
meaningless. The court disposed of this claim by observing that the
statutory language would be meaningless only if teachers were the
sole class of public school employees. 13 "Since other certificated employees, such as principals and counselors, are also public school
employees, that term is not meaningless in light of our construc8. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1981).
9. Id § 23.40.200(c).
10. Indeed, commentators routinely included Alaska in the group of states allowing teachers to strike. See, e.g., McCann & Smiley, The NationalLabor Relations
Act and the Regulation of Public Employee Collective Bargaining, 13 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 479, 513-14 (1976); Note, supra note 4, at 577-78.
11. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.250(5) (1981).
12. 648 P.2d at 995-96.
13. Id
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tion." 4 The court acknowledged the possibility that such employees
might have the right to strike but did not resolve that issue.15
The majority found further support for its statutory construction by reference to the legislature's silence on the issue. The court
found, upon an extensive examination of the law in other jurisdictions, that when PERA was enacted in 1972, the prevailing rule was
that public employees had no right to strike in the absence of express
statutory authorization.1 6 According to the court, the legislature's
failure to expressly disavow the majority rule as it applied to teachers could only be taken as its affirmation of the rule.17
The court then turned to the question whether a right to strike
exists under common law. The court adhered to the prevailing rule
in finding no such right.18 In reaching its decision, the court was
influenced by "a recognition of the special role that teachers fill in
society and [the court's] acknowledgment of [its] functional limitations.

. .

when attempting to make social policy decisions."' 19

-

Whether the Exclusion of Teachers from the Strike and
Interest Arbitration Provisions of PERA Is a Denial
of Equal Protection
1. Summary of Opinions. Having concluded that teachers
have no right to strike under Alaska law, the court was compelled to
address the association's argument that the legislative exclusion of
teachers from both the right to strike and the interest arbitration provisions of PERA constituted a denial of equal protection under the
United States and Alaska Constitutions. Accordingly, the court
scrutinized the exclusion to determine whether it bore a "substantial
relation" 20 to the dual purposes of PERA which are "to promote
harmonious and cooperative relations between government and its
employees and to protect the'2 public by assuring effective and orderly
operations of government." '
The court looked beyond PERA in determining whether the exclusion bore a substantial relation to the purpose of promoting harmonious and cooperative public employer/employee relations. The
14. Id

15. Id at n.5.
16. Id at 995-96.
17. Id at 996.

18. Id
19. Id

20. The court employed the "substantial relation" standard applicable to the
Alaska Constitution, noting that if the exclusion could withstand this level of scrutiny, it would also pass muster under the less strict "rational basis" standard which
would have been applied under the United States Constitution. 648 P.2d at 996 n.7.
21. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.070 (1981).
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court found this purpose fulfilled, not by the provisions of PERA,
but rather by the provisions in Title 14 (Education) for collective
bargaining, 22 advisory mediation, 23 and binding grievance arbitration.24 The court disposed of the association's contention that the
absence of a right to strike would encourage school boards to negotiobligation 25 to bargain in
ate in bad faith by noting that a statutory
26
boards.
school
on
imposed
good faith is
Having found the first purpose of PERA fulfilled, the court considered whether the exclusion assured effective and orderly governmental operations. This question could only be answered
affirmatively, as the primary effect of teachers' work stoppages is to
disrupt the operation of the schools. Thus, denying teachers the
insuring
right to strike bore a substantial relation to the purpose of
27
that the operation of the schools would not be impaired.
The court's construction of the statute did not satisfy the association, which further argued that the concurrent exclusion from the
compulsory interest arbitration provision constituted a denial of
equal protection since all other public employees who are denied the
right to strike are given the right to engage in interest arbitration
under the statute. The court stated: "It is permissible for the legislature to have found that teachers, although necessary to the functioning of society so as to forbid strikes, were not so essential as to
require compulsory arbitration. Thus the strike provisions . . . are
related to the legislative goal of uninterrupted school
substantially
28
operation."
Chief Justice Rabinowitz agreed with the majority's statutory
construction. He dissented sharply, however, from the majority's
equal protection analysis. The chief justice framed the equal protection issue differently, stating:
The question is not, however, whether the legislature is required
to grant arbitration rights to public employees; rather, it is
whether the legislature, having granted strike or binding arbitration rights to a substantial portion of public employees, can lawfully deny 29these same rights to a particular sub-class of public
employees.
Rather than asking whether there was a fit between the exclusion
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id §§ 14.20.550-.560.
Id §§ 14.20.570-.580.
Id § 14.20.590.
Id § 14.20.550.
648 P.2d at 997.
Id
Id
Id at 999 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
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and the legislative purpose, the chief justice compared the group excluded with the group included under the legislative act. In his opinion, differential treatment of the two groups could have been
justified only if it had been "shown that there is a substantial difference between the group excluded and the group covered by the act.
The suggested difference must be such that it is reasonable to treat
'30
the group differently with respect to the legislation in question.
This analysis enabled the chief justice to conclude that "no persuasive reason has been advanced for the exclusion of public school
teachers from the limited right to strike - binding arbitration provision provided for in [ALASKA STAT. §] 23.40.200.1131
2. Comparative Analysis of Opinions. The majority's equal
protection analysis appears, at first blush, to be an unjustified rejection of the association's legal position, especially when compared to
the sharp dissent of the chiefjustice. Upon closer examination, however, it is apparent that the court did not believe that teachers would
have no rights as employees following its decision. Teachers have
the rights to engage in bargaining as a means of achieving recognition of their demands related to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment and to employ advisory mediation as a means
of impasse resolution. 32 Thus, the court did not find it necessary that
teachers should have either the right to strike or the right to engage
in binding interest arbitration in order to give meaning to their recognized rights as employees. In this respect, the majority exhibited
great deference to the legislative determination that teachers were
not in need of these bargaining weapons.
The court did not view the statutory rights to strike or to engage
in binding interest arbitration as ends in themselves. Instead, the
court's analysis is apparently based on the assumption that such
rights are but one part of the whole of public employer/employee
relations; they may or may not be a necessary part of the relationship. When examined from this perspective, teachers are not placed
at a disadvantage in relation to other public employees when they
are denied the right to strike or the right to engage in binding interest arbitration.
The court did not ignore the teachers' position that they, as employees, were in need of a method of impasse resolution. Instead,
the court looked closely at the rights granted to teachers under Title
14. These rights include collective bargaining, 33 binding grievance
30. Id (citations omitted).

31. Id
32. ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.20.550-.560, .570-.590 (1982).
33. Id §§ 14.20.550-.560.
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35
arbitration, 34 and, most importantly, advisory impasse mediation.
The existence of the statutory right to engage in advisory mediation
was critical to the court's disposition of the equal protection question. Mediation is an alternative to both strikes and interest arbitration as a method of impasse resolution. 36 Thus, under the provisions
of Title 14, teachers are provided a method for resolving collective
bargaining disputes with their employers. Although mediation is a
less coercive method of impasse resolution, 37 the court recognized
that the legislature had adopted it as the proper method to be used
between teachers and boards of education. The court refused, as a
matter of proper equal protection analysis, to examine the wisdom of
this legislative choice and accepted the legislature's decision that mediation would be the only method of impasse resolution used in the
public schools.
Having satisfied itself that teachers do enjoy many of the benefits conferred by PERA, it appears that the court became less concerned with whether exclusion of this group from the statutory
provisions bore a fair and substantial relation to the legislative purpose of promoting harmonious and cooperative labor relations, and
more concerned with whether the exclusion bore the proper relation
to the enunciated purpose of "assuring effective and orderly operations of government." While focusing on this purpose, the court
could arrive at but one conclusion - that the exclusion did bear a
fair and substantial relation to this particular legislative purpose. By
focusing on this legislative purpose, the court tacitly communicated
its concern for the disruptive effects of strikes by public school teachers. It is this concern which caused the court to declare that the need
of teachers for an effective method of impasse resolution was satisfied by the provisions for mediation contained in Title 14 and to
conclude that the legislative purpose of preventing interruption of
governmental services was satisfied by the exclusion of teachers from
the right to strike and the interest arbitration provisions of PERA.
Whether characterized as a deference to legislative choice or simply

34. Id § 14.20.590.

35. Id §§ 14.20.570-.580.
36. See Note, supra note 4.
37. Mediation, due to its advisory nature, requires the parties to concede very
little of their control over the bargaining process. With a strike, the employer has no
control over the employees' activities. In arbitration, neither party can control the
result as they might otherwise be able to do through negotiation on the basis of a
strong position since resolution of the impasse is achieved through an independent
third party's judgment which binds the parties. In the private sector, interest arbitration is available as an impasse resolution mechanism only if the parties demonstrate a clear intent in the collective bargaining agreement to submit their
bargaining differences to arbitration. See, e.g., Local 50 v. Newspaper Printing
Corp., 399 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), afdper curiam, 518 F.2d 351 (6th Cir.
1975).
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as a judicial assumption, the court's acceptance of mediation as an
effective method of impasse resolution allowed it to safely conclude
that the exclusion did not violate equal protection.
Another assumption appears to have shaped the court's decision
as well. Although the court did not express this view, it appeared to
believe that teachers are not in the same category as other public
employees, such as sanitation workers, street maintenance crews,
policemen, and firemen. Teachers are, instead, professionals who do
not need to invoke the traditional weapons of labor in their disputes
with the school district as an employer. Stated differently, the court
appeared to assume that PERA is protective legislation, designed to
assure that the rights of nonprofessional public employees are not
trammeled in the course of the employer/employee relationship. 38
Teachers, however, are professionals who, by virtue of the nature of
their positions, are not in need of such protection. The professionalprovides adequate protection of their rights as
ism of teachers
employees. 39
Chief Justice Rabinowitz, in his dissent, appears to have viewed
the rights to strike and to engage in binding interest arbitration as
ends in themselves. His equal protection analysis is based on the
theory that a benefit must be conferred on all if it is to be conferred
on anyone. If the government chooses to differentiate among
is justifiable only to the extent that a
groups, such differentiation
'persuasive reason" 40 supports the legislative choice.
The chief justice correctly recognized that the exclusion of
teachers from the right to strike and the binding interest arbitration
provisions of PERA "significantly handicaps public school teachers
in their collective bargaining efforts."' 4' A disadvantage exists to the
extent that teachers, unlike other public employees, have no coercive
tactics available for use in the bargaining process. The existence of a
handicap is germane only to the extent that it triggers equal protection, but is not dispositive of the issue. This is where the chief justice
differed from the majority and erred in his analysis. He allowed the
existence of differential treatment to control his analysis and did not
look to the purpose for the differential treatment to determine
whether that purpose legitimized the exclusion. In short, his focus
38. Professors at state universities of Alaska are covered by PERA. Carter v.
Alaska Public Employees Ass'n, 662 P.2d 916, 917 n.l (Alaska 1983). The explanation for giving this group of professionals the protection of PERA and not treating
the public school teachers similarly may lie in the fact that teachers receive collective bargaining recognition and rights under Title 14, while professors' rights are not
recognized elsewhere.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 112-17.
40. 648 P.2d at 999 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
41. Id
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on the exclusion itself and his disapproval of that exclusion allowed
him to be unpersuaded by the rationale in support of the legislative
choice. He either failed to recognize or chose to ignore the rule that
if the legislatively imposed handicap bears a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate legislative purpose, then differential treatment
is constitutional.
The difference, between the majority and dissenting opinions
regarding whether the exclusion of teachers from PERA's right to
strike and binding interest arbitration provisions bore a fair and substantial relation to the stated legislative purpose, was due to differing
concepts of the nature of public sector labor relations. Chief Justice
Rabinowitz apparently believes that all public employees must have
the most powerful weapons available to insure the success of the collective bargaining process. His opinion is grounded in the erroneous
belief that all public employees, like private sector laborers, are oppressed by their employers and must have the same tools available to
them if healthy labor relations are to be achieved. Differences between public sector and private sector employment do exist which
make public sector collective bargaining quite different from that in
the private sector. The private sector relationship has been characterized as a struggle between the domineering forces of capital and
the underpowered forces of labor. 42 The public sector relationship,
especially in the situation of public schools, cannot be so characterized. This difference renders the justifications for the right to strike
or the right to binding interest arbitration in the private sector inapplicable to the situation found in the public sector. Thus, the chief
justice's underlying assumptions have no place in the case of public
sector employer/employee relations.
III.

A.

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF Anchorage Education Association

Statutory Construction

The majority's interpretation of the language embodied in
PERA appears to be a correct reading of the literal terms of the statute. However, the propriety of the majority's statutory construction
does not render the consequences of the decision any more
acceptable.
The troublesome result of the court's statutory interpretation is
that the majority was compelled to conclude that the term "public
school employees" in the right to strike provision of PERA might
42. This notion is, to a great extent, embodied in the National Labor Relations
Act. As amended in 1947, the Act contains a finding that industrial strife is traceable to employers' denials of employee rights. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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include principals and counselors. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that this is what the legislature had in mind, the statute is illogical. It is difficult to believe that the legislature would deny
teachers the limited right to strike while granting that right to administrative personnel. Administrators do not, as a rule, engage in collective bargaining or other concerted labor activities. 43 Instead,
administrators' interests are aligned with those of the school board
44
or "management" side of the employer/employee relationship.
The likelihood that they would engage in concerted activities, including strikes, is therefore diminished. A limited right to strike
under PERA would have little or no meaning for these persons.
Having concluded that the term "public school employees" may
include principals and counselors, the court will find it difficult to
conclude that these persons have no right to strike. 45 Should the
court conclude, in the future, that PERA does not include principals
and/or counselors, the term "public school employees" will have no
meaning.4 6 Although stating that it reserved decision on the issue,
the court effectively foreclosed the possibility of answering the issue
in the negative.
A serious equal protection issue is then raised. The legislature
has granted a limited right to strike to a small class of public school
employees while denying it to the larger class of employees which
includes teachers and noncertificated personnel. 47 The justification
for this differential treatment is elusive, and it is difficult to believe
that the distinction bears any relation, much less a fair and substantial relation, to a legitimate legislative purpose. Indeed, it is difficult
to grasp any purpose behind such differential treatment. Administrative personnel, such as principals and counselors, are a more integral part of the school's management team than are teachers. Two
conclusions flow from this premise. First, it is doubtful that these
43. There are, however, exceptions to the general rule. Principals in Butte,
Montana, organized and struck in February, 1983, due to a dispute with the board
of education over job security in anticipation of layoffs expected in the 1983-84
school year. Schools Close In Mont. CityAs Officials Walk Off Job, Durham [N.C.]
Morning Herald, Feb. 2, 1983, at 2A, col. 2 (Associated Press story).
44. See generally Peterson, The Politics of American Education, in REVIEW OF
RESEARCH IN EDUCATION 348 (F. Kerlinger & J. Carrol eds. 1974).
45. A conclusion that principals and counselors have no right to strike would
render the statutory language meaningless unless the court would hold that superintendents and/or assistant superintendents might have a right to strike. The absurdity of such a conclusion is obvious.
46. Previously, in Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula
Borough Dist. Classified Ass'n, 590 P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska 1979), the court held that
noncertificated employees are not covered by the collective bargaining provisions of
PERA.
47. See id
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persons would exercise the right to strike against the management
team of which they are a part.4 8 Second, and more importantly, they
will not utilize collective bargaining as a means of negotiating their
contracts. Instead, their contracts will be established through amicable discussion on an individual basis with their superiors. In essence, they have the influence to obtain favorable contract terms by
virtue of their positions on the management team. Thus, principals
and counselors -are not so downtrodden as to need a coercive tactic
such as a limited right to strike in order to deal effectively with their
employers. Indeed, the fact that they stand on a more equal footing
with their employers than do teachers indicates that principals and
counselors are less in need of the protective weapon provided by a
limited right to strike.
The tacit intent to avoid the disruptive effect of a teachers'
strike, which helped to shape the Avchorage Education Association
decision, also militates against the conclusion that the legislature
could have intended that principals and counselors enjoy a limited
right to strike under PERA. A strike by principals and counselors is
potentially as disruptive as a strike by teachers. 4 9 Why the legislature would allow such disruption to occur at the hands of principals
and counselors, but not at the hands of teachers, is unclear.
It is difficult to conclude that a right of principals and counselors to strike bears a fair and substantial relation to the purpose of
PERA to prevent interruption of governmental services. Nor can the
right be necessary to create harmonious employer/employee relations, as such harmony already exists to a large extent. 50 When compared with the apparent right of principals and counselors to strike,
the exclusion of teachers from the right to strike provisions of the
statute would, in all likelihood, fail to pass equal protection scrutiny.
The problem is hypothetical at this point since the court expressly reserved decision on the issue whether principals and counselors do, in fact, enjoy a limited right to strike under PERA.5' By
reserving decision on this issue, the court delayed confronting a serious equal protection issue.
A subsidiary problem with the court's construction of the statute
is that it considers counselors to be nonteaching personnel. While
48. In 1979, 181 strikes involving 58,600 teachers were reported. In 1980, 232
strikes occurred, involving 107,700 teachers. No work stoppages involving principals were reported in either year. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPr. OF
LABOR, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1980 at 7.
49. By enlisting the sympathy of teachers, the striking principals in Butte,
Montana, see supra note 43, were able to close the 6400 student district when teachers refused to cross the picket line.
50. See supra note 48.

51. 648 P.2d at 995 n.5.
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counselors in a larger school district such as Anchorage may have
duties more akin to those of administrators, the more probable situation in the smaller districts of the state is that they function more like
teachers.5 2 Although Alaska has not decided whether counselors are
to be considered teachers or administrators, other states consider
counselors to be teaching personnel for purposes of collective bargaining and tenure.53 A legislative decision to grant a limited right
to strike only to one sub-class of teachers is difficult to justify either
as a matter of law or policy.
The legislature's choice of terminology forced the court to engage in statutory construction with preposterous results. More importantly, the necessary construction creates a potentially serious
equal protection issue. This situation could have been avoided if the
court had employed another available avenue of reasoning to
achieve the same result.
The court could have found that Title 14 is the exclusive statutory regulation of certificated public school employees' labor activities. Title 14 contains extensive regulation of the collective
bargaining relationship between certificated employees and their
employers, ranging from recognition of the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining,54 to provisions for binding grievance
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.5 5 These provisions
specifically address the needs of teachers and other certificated personnel, yet stop short of creating the right to strike. Advisory mediation is the primary method of impasse resolution under Title 14 and,
if it is unsuccessful, the governor may appoint an advisory arbitrator
as the final step in the bargaining process. 56 This scheme for impasse
resolution appears to be in direct conflict with the language of the
right to strike provision of PERA on which the association relied.
By applying the rule of statutory construction that a more specific
statute controls a conflicting, more general statute, which is arguably
applicable to the situation, 57 the court could have held that the spe52. While teaching duties are a matter of discretion in the local district, small

districts may lack the demand for or finances to support a full-time counselor.
Therefore, counselors' duties may include classroom instruction, as either a primary
or secondary responsibility.

53. See Capella v. Board of Educ. of Camden County Vocational & Technical
School, 145 N.J. Super. 209, 367 A.2d 444 (App. Div. 1976); Krolop v. South Range
Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 47 Ohio App. 2d 208, 353 N.E.2d 642 (1974); McCoy v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 12, 38 Pa. Commw. 29, 391 A.2d 1119 (1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
54. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.560 (1982).
55. Id § 14.20.590.
56. Id § 14.20.580(c).
57. See, e.g.,

National Bank v. State, 642 P.2d 811, 817 (Alaska 1982)
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cific regulations in Title 14 supplant the more general provisions of
58
PERA.
This approach would have enabled the court to reach the conclusion that teachers have no right to strike, while avoiding its anomalous conclusion that perhaps principals and counselors, but not
teachers, enjoy a limited statutory right to strike. This approach
would not have required reversal of any prior holding that PERA
governs public school employer/employee relations.5 9 Prior to
Anchorage Education Association, the supreme court relied exclusively on Title 14 when called upon to determine questions concerning the collective bargaining rights of teachers.6 0 By adopting this
approach, the court could have avoided the problems arising out of
its statutory construction in Anchorage EducationAssociation.
B.

Equal Protection Analysis

The majority's equal protection analysis focused almost exclusively on one purpose of PERA: to assure that governmental services would not be disrupted by labor strife. Although this is a
legitimate and salutary legislative purpose, it is troublesome that the
court allowed it to be nearly dispositive of the equal protection issue.
The majority's focus on only one of the two purposes of PERA undermines the legitimacy of its equal protection analysis.
The problem with the majority's shortsighted view of the purpose of PERA is that if continuity of governmental services is the
controlling purpose of the legislation, it follows that no group of
public employees should have the right to strike or, at a bare minimum, the rights of public employees to engage in concerted activities
should be severely restricted. This is not, however, the approach to
public sector employer/employee relations endorsed by the legislature in PERA. The legislature recognized the need for harmonious
employer/employee relations in the public sector 6 ' by allowing employees to bargain collectively, 62 while simultaneously recognizing
("[S]pecific statutes must control over general statutes, when the two enactments
cannot be harmonized.") (footnote omitted).

58. Although the rule of statutory construction requires reconciliation of the

two statutes if possible, that could not be achieved in this instance without rendering
the term "public school employees" meaningless. Had the court hypothesized, as it
did in Anchorage Education Association, that the term may include principals and
counselors, the conflict would still exist since principals are granted collective bargaining rights under Title 14.
59. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Rouse v. Anchorage School Dist., 613 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1980);

Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d
416 (Alaska 1977).
61. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.070 (1981).
62. Id § 23.40.080.
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the public's need for continuity in many governmental services, 63
thus restricting the types of coercive tactics available to certain
classes of public employees as modes of enforcing their collective
bargaining rights. 64
The difficulty of accommodating these competing interests is evident on the face of the statute. The right to strike or to engage in
other concerted activities in situations of impasse is critical to enforcing employees' right to bargain with their employer. 65 This right,
however, is at odds with the public's need for uninterrupted governmental services. Thus, the legislature has divided public employees
into three classes for purposes of granting the right to strike or the
corresponding right to engage in binding interest arbitration. 66 First,
critical employees, such as policemen and firemen, are denied the
67
right to strike, yet granted the right to binding interest arbitration.
Second, semi-critical employees are granted the right to engage in
strikes not longer than ten days in duration after engaging in mediation without reaching agreement. 68 Third, noncritical employees are
allowed an unlimited right to strike. 69 In light of this extensive legislative effort to accommodate the recognized, yet competing interests
of the public and governmental employees, it is distressing that the
majority concluded that the legislature could properly exclude teachers from the right to strike provisions of the statute.
If the majority exhibited one type of shortsightedness in focusing solely on the purpose of PERA to prevent interruption of governmental services, Chief Justice Rabinowitz exhibited another type
in his dissent. His nearly exclusive focus on the legislative intent to
promote harmonious employment relations in the public sector led
him to conclude that the exclusion of teachers from the right to strike
provisions of the statute was at odds with that purpose, thus indefensible against the mandate of equal protection. 70 While this is a legitimate observation, its validity is undermined by the existence of the
second purpose of PERA. The chief justice recognized this second
purpose in stating that the equal protection violation arises not out
of the denial of the right to strike, but out of that denial when coupled with the legislative failure to substitute the right to binding interest arbitration for the right to strike.71 He gave little credence to
63. Id § 23.40.070.

64. Id § 23.40.200.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.

66. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(a) (1981).
67. Id § 23.40.200(a)(1).
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id § 23.40.200(a)(2).
Id § 23.40.200(a)(3).
648 P.2d at 999 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
Id
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the proposition that the advisory mediation provisions of Title 14
provide an adequate substitute, dismissing the majority's position in
a footnote. 72 When compared to the majority's equal protection
analysis, it becomes apparent that the chief justice missed the mark,
relying on a belief that, if public employees' bargaining rights are to
be meaningful, they must have the most coercive tactics available to
enforce them. In this respect, his equal protection analysis lacks legal validity.
The majority's focus, however, is defensible since the court believed that the purpose of preventing disruption of governmental
services is satisfied by the mediation provisions of Title 14. Without
questioning the wisdom of advisory mediation as an impasse resolution mechanism, the majority accepted it as a substitute for the right
to strike. This acceptance is implicitly founded upon a concern for
the court's proper role in reviewing the legal propriety of legislative
acts.73 The court, however, should not have accepted advisory mediation as a valid impasse resolution mechanism without more serious
inquiry into its efficacy. The court should have examined more fully
whether the legislature intended that mediation at the hands of the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service would adequately promote harmonious labor relations between teachers and boards of education. 74 Although this inquiry might have brought the court
dangerously close to crossing the line of demarcation between legislative and judicial functions, it would have added more credibility to
the court's decision on the most difficult and sensitive issue presented
by the case.

IV.

THE LARGER PERSPECTIVE

The court's decision in Anchorage EducationAssociation is not
unusual when compared to similar decisions in other jurisdictions.
While some state courts have found that teachers have a right to
strike under PERA-type legislation, 75 other jurisdictions have found
no such right under similar statutes.7 6 Moreover, such exclusions
72. Id. at n.6.
73. Id at 996.
74. One practitioner with twenty-one years of experience in collective bargaining has characterized the work of the FMCS in non-major labor disputes as "at its
best ineffective and at its worst harmful." Interview with Allen Siegel, of Arent,
Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C., in Durham, N.C. (Sept. 6, 1983).
75. See, e.g., School Dist. for Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314,
157 N.W.2d 206 (1968); Forest Hills School Dist. v. Forest Hills Educ. Ass'n, 45 Pa.
Commw. 633, 405 A.2d 1346 (1979).
76. San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d 838, 154
Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979); School Dist. No. 351, Oneida County v. Oneida Educ. Ass'n,
98 Idaho 486, 567 P.2d 830 (1977); Hortonville Educ. Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint
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have been upheld against equal protection challenges. 77 These challenges differ from the one in Anchorage EducationAssociation, how-

ever, in that most of them challenge the differential treatment of
private and public sector employees. 78 Indeed, it appears that the
equal protection challenge presented in Anchorage EducationAssoci-

ation is quite novel in that it is founded on the differential treatment
of classes of public employees. 79 While the legal basis of this challenge may be unprecedented elsewhere, the outcome is foreshadowed by decisions made within the past decade in other
jurisdictions. The results of those decisions evidence a tendency to
restrict, through judicial interpretation, the collective bargaining
rights of teachers under PERA-type legislation. 80 This tendency reflects a similar trend in state legislatures to deny teachers collective
bargaining rights by balking at the prospect of enacting PERA-type
legislation. 8 '
Both courts and legislatures have retreated from the era of expansion of teachers' collective bargaining rights which existed between 1970 and 1975.82 The Alaska Supreme Court joined this

retreat soon after it commenced. In 1977, in Kenai Borough Peninsula School District v. Kenai Peninsula EducationAssociation,83 the

court was called upon to determine the proper scope of mandatory
bargaining topics under Title 14. It held that the scope of mandatory
bargaining topics was quite limited, including only salaries, fringe
benefits, the number of hours to be worked, and the amount of leave
School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975), rev'd on other grounds,
426 U.S. 482 (1976).
77. See, e.g., School Dist. No. 351, Oneida County v. Oneida Educ. Ass'n, 98
Idaho 486, 567 P.2d 830 (1977); Minnesota Fed'n of Teachers Local 59 v. Minnesota
Special School Dist. No. 1, 258 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1977); Hortonville Educ. Ass'n
v. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 426 U.S. 482 (1976).
78. See, e.g., School Dist. No. 351, Oneida County v. Oneida Educ. Ass'n, 98
Idaho 486, 567 P.2d 830 (1977). But see Hortonville Educ. Ass'n v. Hortonville
Joint School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (challenge based on grant of binding interest arbitration to police and firemen but not to teachers).
79. But see Hortonville Educ. Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1, 66
Wis. 2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 426 U.S. 482 (1976).
80. Jascourt, Labor Relations in the Decade Ahead, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 357, 363
(1981).
81. Clark, LaborRelations in the DecadeAhead: A ManagementPerspective, 10
J.L. & EDUc. 365, 366 (1981).
82. See id But see Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act, 1983 Ohio
Legis. Bull. 1121 (Anderson) (enacted June 30, 1983 and modeled after National
Labor Relations Act). (Ohio is one of only three states predicted to enact public
sector collective bargaining statutes in the 1980's. Clark, supra note 81, at 366).
83. 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977).

1984] THE RIGHTS OFPUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

95

time to be granted.8 4 Topics such as relief from nonprofessional
chores, elementary planning time, paraprofessional tutors, teacher
specialists, teacher's aides, class size, pupil-teacher ratio, teacher
ombudsmen, teacher evaluation of administrators, school calendar,
selection of instructional materials, use of secondary department
heads, secondary teacher preparation and planning time, and
teacher representation on school board advisory committees were
85
found to be nonnegotiable.
The justification for excluding these items from the scope of
bargaining is found in Title 14, which provides that: "Nothing in
[ALASKA STAT. §§] 14.20.550-14.20.600 of this chapter may be construed as an abrogation or delegation of the legal responsibilities,
powers, and duties of the school board including its right to make
final decisions on policies."8 6 Both the statute and the court's examination of the employment relation between teachers and boards of
education evidence a deference to the position of the school board as
the ultimate decisionmaker on questions of educational policy.
The restrictive scope of bargaining under Title 14, as interpreted
by the court, does not vary substantially from the scope of bargaining found to exist under similar legislation in other jurisdictions.8 7
Indeed, it appears that a limited scope of bargaining is the rule in a
majority of other states,88 particularly those which addressed the issue after 1975.89 The rule, however, is not unanimous. 90
The importance of the decisions in Kenai andAnchorageEducationAssociation lies not so much in the legal rules that teachers enjoy
only a limited scope of bargaining and have no right to strike or
otherwise compel their employer to reach agreement on contract
terms, but rather in the court's conception of the employment rela84. Id at 423.

85. Id
86. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.610 (1981).
87. See, e.g., Chee-Chaw Teachers' Ass'n v. Unified School Dist. No. 247, 225
Kan. 561, 593 P.2d 406 (1979); Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd.
of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978); In re Cumberland Valley School Dist.,
394 A.2d 946 (Pa. 1978).
88. See cases cited supra note 87.
89. See cases cited supra note 87. But see City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976) (scope of
mandatory bargaining topics includes the impact of matters which are otherwise
matters of educational policy).
90. See, e.g., City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 73
Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976) (mandatory bargaining topics include not only

matters which are primarily related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment,
but also matters of educational policy which have an impact on wages, hours, and
conditions of employment, such as teacher evaluations, a just cause standard of dismissal, reduction in force, discipline of problem students who represent threats to
teachers' safety, school calendar, class size, and reading program).
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tionship between teachers and boards of education. In this respect,
the decisions were shaped as much by policy considerations as they
were by the statutes construed. These policy considerations are critical to teachers' associations, boards of education, and counsel when
preparing for and engaging in contract negotiations. A proper respect for these policy considerations by both parties to the negotiations may ameliorate the potentially harsh effects of these decisions
on the teachers' position at the bargaining table.
A.

The Political Balance of Power and the Political Processes
Involved in Public Sector Collective Bargaining

The initial consideration which shaped these decisions, particularly that in Kenai, is the notion that the school board, as a governmental entity, has certain functions which cannot, according to
statute, 9 1 be infringed upon by the collective bargaining process.
Particularly, the board of education's function as the sole educational policymaker for the district is endangered by collective bargaining. 92 It is the board's duty to decide matters of educational
policy and provide a meaningful education to its students. 93 The
legislature declared that these duties are nondelegable and that the
fulfillment of these
duties shall not occur through the collective bar94
gaining process.
The court's protection of the school board's function as the educational policymaker is implicitly founded on an attempt to maintain the balance of power between teachers and boards of education.
School boards are political bodies and are therefore susceptible to
the influence of a number of interest groups including parents, students, teachers, and taxpayers. As recognized by the United States
Supreme Court, "decisionmaking by a public employer is above all a
political process. . . . Through exercise of their political influence
as part of the electorate, the employees have the opportunity to affect
the decisions of government representatives who sit on the other side
of the bargaining table." 95 Submission of matters of policy to the
bargaining process would tip the balance of political power in favor
of teachers and away from the board and its constituency of parents,
91. ALJsKA STAT. § 14.20.610 (1982).
92. The Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged this threat in Kenai, 572 P.2d at
421.
93. See, e.g., Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual
Rights, 74 MicH. L. Rnv. 1373, 1380 (1976).
94. ALAsKA STAT. § 14.20.610 (1981). It is important to note at this juncture
that inKenai the court stopped short of holding that fulfillment of these duties could
not be influenced by collective bargaining. The importance of the statutory limitation is discussed infra at note 117.
95. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 228 (1977).
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students, and taxpayers. This imbalance, in turn, would seriously
impair the board of education's capacity to fulfill its duty as policymaker for the schools by allowing one interest group to have dual
influences on the decisionmaking process.
The court's attempt to protect the balance of power is justified
by the peculiar function of boards of education in our society.
School boards, perhaps more than any other governmental entity,
are involved on a daily basis in policy decisions which involve
choices among intangibles on which there is adequate room for disagreement. 96 When deciding matters of policy, the school board must
consider philosophies, techniques, and theories of education on the
one hand and fiscal, administrative, and political factors on the
other. The decisions thus arrived at are the result of both administrative expertise and training and the political process. To add a
third and more powerful factor to the process by allowing matters of
policy to be proper subjects of collective bargaining would distort
the process and perhaps damage it beyond repair.
This is not to say, however, that teachers can have no influence
on educational policy decisions. The political process remains available for this purpose. A matter that is not properly submitted to
collective bargaining may be properly submitted to the public at
large. Public sentiment cannot be lightly disregarded by members of
a board of education who depend on the electorate to keep them in
office. Thus, effective political action by teachers' groups remains a
fair alternative to collective bargaining when matters of educational
policy are involved.
The political process can also serve as a substitute for the right
to strike. The purpose of a strike is, after all, to break an impasse in
contract negotiations and compel the employer to reach agreement
on the terms of the contract. The efficacy of the political process as a
mode of influencing the board of education's stance in contract negotiations is not easily discounted. The political process has frequently been utilized to end strikes in the public sector.97 There
96. An illustration of this is the debate concerning open classrooms several
years ago. See, e.g., Duke, The Selling of the Open School, EDUC. DIG., Oct. 1973,

at 18. ("Despite philosophical arguments attesting to the humaneness of open education, the open school is not going to win acceptance by Boards of Education,
administrators and parents by philosophical justification alone.").
97. See L. McDONNELL & A. PASCAL, ORGANIZED TEACHERS IN AMERICAN
(1979). In 1974, strike-weary citizens found their own way to end a twoweek strike by teachers in the Perry, Ohio school district. They demanded a settlement and enforced their demand by guarding the door of the room where teachers
and administrators were negotiating and refusing to allow either party to leave
before a settlement was reached. The settlement was reached around 6:00 a.m. and
teachers returned to the classrooms that afternoon. Interview with E.E. Goodwin,
Superintendent of the Perry School District in Perry, Ohio (December 28, 1983).
SCHOOLS
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appears to be no persuasive reason why the after-the-fact utility of
the political process in resolving public sector labor disputes cannot
be translated into before-the-fact utility. The effect would be the
same as that of a strike, but without its adverse consequences. 98 The
impact may not be as dramatic as that of a strike, but the present
state of the law dictates that the political process may be the only
effective alternative by which teachers may protect their interests as
employees.
B.

The "Mature" Employer/Employee Relationship between
Teachers and Boards of Education

The decisions in Kenai and Anchorage Education Association
implicitly adopt the notion that teachers are professional employees
who do not need the protections afforded to private employees under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 99 and to other public em-

ployees under PERA.1° Before an attempt is made to dismiss this
notion as the rhetoric of another era, it must be remembered that the
National Education Association (NEA) endorsed this position until
1967.101 Indeed, "NEA still prides itself on the fact that it is aprofessional organization, not a union. . . . [It] describes its negotiations
as professional and denies that it is engaging in collective bargaining
of the type that generally characterizes the activities in private industry operating under the Taft-Hartley Act."' 02 With the primary
teachers' organization espousing such views about the professional
nature of its members' activities, it is understandable that the court
would recognize a distinction between the needs of teachers and
those of blue collar workers.
In determining whether teachers need to engage in collective
bargaining, the underlying determinative factors appear to be the intimacy and civility often found in the relationship between profesThis is an example of how an informal political process - mobilization of public
sentiment - can be utilized to solve problems that teachers and administrators cannot solve when left to their own devices.
98. See Note, supra note 4, at 578-79, for a discussion of the ill effects of a
teachers' strike.
99. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976).
100. PERA covers "any employee of a public employer, whether or not in the
classified service of the public employer, except elected or appointed officials or
teachers or noncertificated employees of school districts." ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.40.250(5) (1981).
101. See Engel, Teacher Negotiation: History and Comment, I J.L. & EDUc. 487,
489-91 (1972) (stating that NEA did not fully support concerted labor activities of its
members until 1967, following a successful strike in the New York City Schools by
members of the more radical American Federation of Teachers).
102. Id at 489 (emphasis in original).
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sionals and their employers.10 3 In NLRB v. Yeshiva University,104
the United States Supreme Court characterized the relationship between the faculty and the administration as a "mature" relationship
which integrates faculty into the decisionmaking process of the university. 0 5 As a result of this integration, the Court deemed the
Yeshiva faculty to be managerial employees and thus exempt from
06
the coverage of the NLRA.
The decision in Yeshiva lacks precedential value in the context
of the Alaska public schools since the NLRA does not apply to public employers. 0 7 This case is significant, however, because the
Supreme Court recognized that the traditional employer/employee
adversarial relationship may cease to exist under certain circum103. This notion is implicit in cases under the NLRA involving faculty in private
educational institutions. When the relationship between faculty and administration
is one of cooperation which integrates faculty into many aspects of the decisionmaking process, the faculty is considered managerial and is not entitled to the protections of the NLRA. E.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). When,
however, the relationship is not cooperative, the faculty is deemed to be within the
class of employees entitled to the protections of the NLRA. E.g., Stephens Inst. v.
NLRB, 620 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1980).
104. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
105. Id at 680.
106. Id at 682. Consider also 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) which provides:
The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited
to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantial equivalent employment, but shall not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service
of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his
parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent
contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act . . . as
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
(emphasis added). 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976) further provides:
Nothing contained herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization,
but no employer subject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem
individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of
any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.
The exclusion of supervisory employees from the coverage of the NLRA by
Congress through the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 138 (1947)
was in direct response to the Supreme Court's holding in Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) that managerial employees were protected by the
NLRA. On its face, the exclusion embraces the idea that managerial employees do
not need the protections given to other employees under the NLRA.
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) (excluding "the United States or any wholly
owned Government corporation. . . or any state or political subdivision thereof'
from the definition of "employer" as used in the NLRA).
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stances in institutions of higher education, thus eliminating the need
for faculty members to engage in concerted activities under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Act.108 The professional input
of these employees on matters of educational policy is valued and
accepted by their employer, thus transforming the relationship from
that of management versus labor to a type of cooperative management relationship involving faculty and administration working toward a common goal.
The presence of the adversarial relationship distinguishes the
situation in Alaska's public schools from that in Yeshiva. In Yeshiva,
the university faculty and administration had a history of cooperative rather than adversarial interactions. Faculty/administration interactions in the Alaska public schools have, since collective
bargaining began, been adversarial.10 9 In Yeshiva, the existing cooperative relationship negated the need for collective bargaining to the
extent that it removed the faculty from the protection of the NLRA.
In Alaska's public schools, the absence of the right to strike and the
presence of a very restrictive scope of bargaining diminish the
chances for developing an effective collective bargaining relationship
and necessitate the development of a cooperative relationship. By
developing such a relationship, Alaska's public school teachers and
administrators can create a substitute for the unbalanced collective
bargaining relationship which now exists.
The Alaska Supreme Court has implied that such a cooperative
labor/management relationship is desirable. In Kenai the court
concluded that fourteen topics were nonnegotiable since they involved matters of educational policy." 0 The court went on, however, to recommend discussion of these topics during contract
negotiations.
As to matters which affect educational policy and are, therefore,
not negotiable, we believe that there is nevertheless implicit in our
statutes the intention that the school boards meet and confer with
the unions. It is desirable that the boards consider teacher proposals on such questions. This will encourage teachers to give the
boards the benefit of their expertise, and to make their positions
known for the board's use in establishing educational policy.I '
108. The Supreme Court's holding in Yeshiva means only that the faculty could
not invoke the enforcement authority of the National Labor Relations Board to
compel the administration to bargain with the faculty representative. The faculty
and administration remain free to bargain voluntarily and independently of the provisions of the NLRA.
109. Collective bargaining is inherently adversarial, since each party is attempting to further its objectives without allowing the other party to attain its objectives.
110. 572 P.2d at 423.
111. Id
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The court made a critical assumption in urging the parties to

meet and confer on nonnegotiable matters of educational policy. It
assumed that administrators would actively consider teachers' views

when formulating policy. As the relationship currently stands, the
court may have assumed too much. This is not to say that adminis-

trators somehow cannot recognize the merit of teachers' policy
views. Instead, it is to say that this approach may have little practi-

cal impact so long as the parties take adversarial stances in the employment relationship. If boards of education and teachers remain
self-proclaimed adversaries, there is no incentive for the board to
take its opposition's views to heart. Indeed, the nature of the rela-

tionship should cause boards to be suspicious of teacher proposals
and perhaps to dismiss them as self-serving or even mutinous.
Boards of education will probably not lend much credence to such
proposals so long as the adversarial relationship exists.
The situation in educational institutions is quite unusual.
Teachers are asking for salaries and benefits comparable to those of

professionals in other fields, 1 2 and for an integral role in the deci-

sionmaking process.'

3

At the same time, they are asking for rights

to engage in the protected concerted activities traditionally granted

to private sector labor." 4 The ultimate absurdity in the situation is
that teachers seek to obtain the former while using the latter. In

other words, they are seeking the stature of professionals by employing blue collar tactics. An alternative exists which may produce
more satisfactory results in teachers' quest for proper respect as professionals. The starting point is the court's recognition in Kenai of

"the benefit of [teachers'] expertise" which may accrue to a school
112. TeachersAverage $12 an Hour - NE,4, Durham [N.C.] Morning Herald,
Dec. 14, 1983, at 14A, col. 1 (Mary Hatwood Futrell, NEA President, issued a statement declaring: "If we are serious about attracting the best and the brightest into
classrooms, then we'll have to think in terms of starting salaries of $20,000 to
$25,000, well above the current $13,500."); see also Odden, Financing Educational
Excellence, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 311, 314 (19S4); Teachers on the Picket Line,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1979, at 70.
113. Peterson, supra note 44.
114. See, e.g., Poltrock, Labor Relations in the Decade.Ahead." A Union Perspective, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 373, 377 (1981). The author states:
Although most states have some kind of collective bargaining law for public employees, few states have laws which cover all teachers and public
employees. In order to solve the problems related to salaries, reduction in
force and other problems, it will be necessary that all states have extensive
public sector laws which give rights to public employees similar to those
rights heretofore given private sector employees.
See also Gee, The Unionization of Mr. Chips." A Survey Analysis of Collective Bargainingin the PublicSchools, 15 WILLAMETTE L.J. 367, 374 (1979); Summers, Public
Sector BargainingProblems of Governmental Decisionmalcing, 44 U. CIN. L. REv.
669, 669-70 (1975).
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board willing to listen to teachers' input on policy decisions. Teachers' views can be invaluable in many instances, as they are shaped by
years of training and experience in the classroom. Their views can
add a different dimension to the ultimate decision confronting the
board and broaden the informational base upon which it is made.
The end result would be to increase the legitimacy of the decision
ultimately made by the board. 115
Integration of teachers' needs and perspectives into the board's
decisionmaking process will necessitate some concessions by both
parties. While the abandonment of unions and collective bargaining
is not recommended, 1 6 the time has arrived to abandon any remnants of a militant approach to collective bargaining and to become
more conciliatory and cooperative at the bargaining table. This is
not to say that teachers should capitulate to the administration. Instead, both parties should drop their adversarial roles and attempt to
respect and accommodate the constraints within which each gide is
operating. In short, they should strive for the type of "mature" relationship which the United States Supreme Court discussed with approval in Yeshiva. 117
A cooperative relationship like that between the faculty and administration in Yeshiva will not simply happen in the Alaska public
schools. Attaining a "mature" relationship between teachers and administrators is a substantial departure from the norm heretofore
known for labor relations and will require concessions from both
sides. Each side must abandon its collective bargaining weapons
and tactics. Although the concessions required may be difficult for
both parties to make, the Yeshiva model cannot be implemented
without them. The incentives for implementing the model are strong
115. See generally Project, supra note 93, at 1380. But see F. WIRT & M. KIRST,
(1975) (the authors condemn
the movement for community involvement and control of the schools as an ineffectual method of governance and decisionmaking).
116. But see Lieberman, Eggs That I Have Laid- Teacher BargainingReconsidered, 60 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 415 (1979) ("The differences [between public and private sector employment] are real and important, and they justify this conclusion:
Providing public sector employees collective bargaining rights similar to those provided private sector employees is undesirable public policy."). It should be noted
here that Mr. Lieberman was a strong advocate for collective bargaining by teachers
who abandoned that role after realizing that the political influence of public employees was an adequate substitute for bargaining rights.
117. The extent to which the Yeshiva model can be implemented is, however,
limited by the nondelegable nature of the duties vested in boards of education. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.610 (1982) (stating that the bargaining provisions of Title 14 shall not be construed as an abrogation or delegation of the board's statutory
duties). Hence, teachers' participation in personnel and similar decisions would be
highly restricted. Their input in matters of curriculum, educational policy, and
other such matters could nevertheless be received and considered.
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION

1984] THE RIGHTS OFPUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

103

and counsel in favor of making the concessions, however difficult
they may be.
For teachers, the incentive is readily apparent. Stripped of the
right to strike and given only a limited scope of bargaining, they are
in a weak position vis-A-vis the board of education at the bargaining
table. Their chances of obtaining their goals through collective bargaining are greatly diminished from their chances of success if given
the right to strike and a broader scope of bargaining. The Yeshiva
model is a workable alternative to teachers' limited bargaining
rights. With a cooperative relationship, teachers can attain what
they cannot attain through collective bargaining.
Under existing law, boards of education are in a superior position at the bargaining table. Their superiority, however, is not conducive to the ultimate task of providing quality education for the
children of Alaska. Indeed, the bargaining strength of boards may
interfere with that task by diverting teachers' efforts away from the
classroom and toward devising methods of overcoming the board's
bargaining strength. The board's power cannot create labor harmony and, in fact, may cause serious labor discord. If boards of education are to fulfill their appointed tasks, labor strife cannot be
allowed to exist. Implementation of the Yeshiva model will eliminate labor discord, thus freeing teachers to concentrate on teaching
and enabling administrators and boards of education to concentrate
on creating and maintaining quality schools.
The public, although not a party to the employment relationship, has a strong interest in this relationship. The public's primary
interest is in the quality of the education offered by its schools. The
public also has an interest in the management of the schools, including the fiscal and political accountability of those in charge. To the
extent that an unequal bargaining relationship channels resources
away from education and management, the public is disserved. If
the public interest is to be served, the present adversarial relationship cannot be maintained.
Citizens provide what is perhaps the most powerful vehicle for
implementation of the Yeshiva model. Through the political process, they can compel teachers and school boards to replace the adversarial collective bargaining relationship with a cooperative effort.
By demanding that both sides abandon the heretofore accepted adversarial relationship and replace it with a cooperative relationship,
the public can help to insure that its interest in the public schools
will be vindicated. The consequences of a failure to heed such a
public demand are obvious. If board members desire to remain in
office and teachers and administrators desire to remain employed,
they cannot take such a public demand lightly. In short, through the
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political process, the public holds the strongest incentive for teachers
and boards of education to attempt to implement the Yeshiva model.
Although a relationship between a school board and its teachers
similar to that existing at Yeshiva University is a substantial departure from the norm, the status quo is not worth preserving if it impairs the quality of public educational institutions. The very limited
fights of Alaska's public school teachers as employees can only engender labor discord. The decisions in Kenai andAnchorage Education Association can legitimately be viewed as giving lip-service
rather than substance to the fights of teachers under Title 14 and
PERA. In the wake of these decisions, collective bargaining can
prove frustrating to teachers and their representatives. The struggle
to get the most out of these meager fights will certainly divert the
parties' attention from the primary business of education and toward
the subsidiary task of labor relations. In the end, everyone will
suffer.
V.

CONCLUSION:

A

SUGGESTED MODEL FOR EMPLOYMENT

RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS FOLLOWING
ANCHORAGE ED UCA TION ASSOCIATION

In Anchorage Education Association, the court could have provided assistance to teachers seeking to vindicate their bargaining
rights under PERA. Had the court reached the opposite conclusion
on either the issue of statutory construction or that of equal protection,"18 the collective bargaining relationship between teachers and
their employers would have retained some balance. The court, however, did not reach that conclusion and it is doubtful that teachers
can look to the court in the future for reversal of the Anchorage Education Association decision.
Legislative action is one alternative for clarifying employment
relations between teachers and boards of education. The legislature
could rectify the judicially created imbalance by expressly defining
the scope of bargaining and/or stating definitively whether the
teachers' impasse resolution mechanism is to remain advisory mediation as it exists under Title 14 or become more coercive, as are the
PERA mechanisms. This does not appear likely, however, since the
legislature has not responded to the court's plea in Kenai for "more
specific guidance on a number of the items which the unions seek to
118. If the court had held that the statute violated equal protection, the logical
legislative response would have been to amend the statute to give teachers the right
either to strike or to engage in binding interest arbitration, thereby preserving the
statutory bargaining rights of other public employees. Such an amendment would
restore the balance of bargaining power between teachers and their employers.
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negotiate." 11 9 Nor has the legislature responded to the decision in
Anchorage Education Association. Thus, the situation must be addressed by teachers, school boards, and their counsel in adjusting
their relationship in the wake of these decisions.
In addressing the problems following Anchorage EducationAssociation, teachers and school boards have two options of self-help
which may blunt the impact of the decision. The first option is to
resort to the political process for resolution of problems following
the decision. The second option is for teachers and school boards to
work together in an attempt to achieve a "mature" relationship similar to that which existed between the faculty and administration in
Yeshiva.
By resorting to the political process, teachers might find an adequate substitute for a broad scope of mandatory bargaining topics
and the right to strike. 120 Political pressure, particularly on behalf of
teachers, may influence the legislature to provide some means of
equalizing the bargaining positions of the parties. The political process may also be used to force boards of education not to exert their
full powers at the bargaining table. Two risks inhere in this tactic.
First, the public may not sympathize with the teachers' position.
Second, resort to the political process may divide community sentiment, thus making it difficult for teachers to teach and for school
boards to administer without encountering the difficult obstacles attendant in such division. These risks make the political process an
unreliable, hence undesirable, option.
The better option is the second option. Teachers and school
boards should abandon the traditional weapons, games, and roles of
the private sector experience. They should strive for the "mature"
relationship shown to exist in Yeshiva. The Alaska Supreme Court,
aided in part by the Alaska legislature, has made it clear that public
school teachers in Alaska will not enjoy the right to strike, the most
powerful weapon available to private sector labor. Nor will they be
able to insist on bargaining on many subjects during contract negotiations. The court has virtually removed teachers from the employer/employee game by finding that teachers have very few rights
and only one weapon - advisory mediation - with which to en22
force those rights. 2 1 The efficacy of this weapon is highly suspect.'
The court's consistently restrictive reading of teachers' rights as employees brings to mind the maxim "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em"
119. 572 P.2d at 423.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
121. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.570 (1981).

122. See Note, supra note 4, at 581.
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as a possible philosophy for teachers' future collective bargaining
efforts.
A cooperative relationship of the type in Yeshiva is a viable option for both teachers and school boards when approaching contract
negotiations. Teachers, on the one hand, will gain recognition of
their professional training and expertise if allowed to interject their
views into the policymaking process. Boards of education, on the
other hand, will be relieved of those aspects of the adversarial relationship which impair the operation of the schools. The problems
inherent in the situation as it now exists will, to a large extent, be
alleviated. In the future, then, boards of education should be more
willing to listen to any input offered by teachers on matters affecting
educational policy. They should accept such input as the product of
professional training and experience which has a proper position in
the policymaking process. Teachers should continue to offer input in
a professional manner, not to gain clout in the collective bargaining
process, but to contribute to the ultimate policy decision. Teachers
should not feel chagrined if their input does not control the decision.
Instead, they must recognize that the board has the interests of various groups in mind and must attempt to accommodate each of these
interests.
While cooperative employment relationships are a departure
from the norm in the public schools, such cooperative relationships
do exist. As an example, two ventures in the public schools that necessitate cooperation between teachers and administration have
proved highly successful. 123 Both teachers' centers' 24 and inservice
123. In at least one community, the development of a federally-funded teacher
center has been so successful that its "effect on what has been a seriously divided
community seems a little short of miraculous." Rosenblatt, The East Ramapo Teachers' Center, TODAY'S EDUCATION, April-May, 1979, at 36. (See infra note 124 for
an explanation of teacher centers.). Indeed, there is evidence that teacher isolation
from the admini tration is a strong obstacle to attaining the goal of quality education; therefore, communication and cooperation between teachers and administrators should be increased. Tye & Tye, TeacherIsolation and SchoolReform, 65 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 319, 320-22 (1984). But see Fahrlander, How to Get Your Ideas
Approved, 64 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 278 (1983) in which the author concludes that
cooperation in the public schools is difficult to attain:
Sir Isaac Newton once stated that each action has an equal and opposite
reaction. He could have been talking about the organization of a school
system. It seems that teachers who try to do their best to educate children
are discouraged by administrators and policy makers who are supposed to
share that goal. This is especially true of the development and implementation of new ideas - ideas for the improvement of course content, teaching methods, resources, teaching aids, and the like.
124. The concept of teacher centers is borrowed from the British, who conceived
the idea in 1964. Reference to the British experience will, therefore, help to define
the concept as American educators attempt to implement it.
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training programs125 involve cooperation between teachers and administrators in order to enhance the professional ability of teachers
and the quality of education they provide. Thus, cooperation is not
unheard of in the public schools. That it has been used in the context of professional training would indicate that it can be used in the
employment relationship. Although the context may be different,
the content of such a relationship is not. Teachers and school boards
should attempt to use the cooperation they have learned in the context of professional training to enhance the employment relationship.
This type of give-and-take relationship between teachers and
school boards cannot be achieved overnight. The scars of the collective bargaining wars of years past run deep. Both sides must work at
developing a cooperative, "mature" relationship. If efforts in this direction prove effective, the end result will be the amelioration of the
effects of Kenai and Anchorage Education Association on teachers
Today British centers serve three basic purposes: 1) inservice training that
will further the growth of fundamental knowledge relevant to educational
problems, 2) social gathering and interaction, and 3) curriculum development. The curriculum development function is particularly important and
is generated from three main bases: national curriculum projects, colleges
and universities, and the teachers themselves.
Caldwell, Transplantingthe British Teacher Center in the U.S., 60 PHI

DELTA KAP-

517, 518 (1979). See also Rosenblatt, supra note 123, for a full explanation of
how one center operates. Teacher centers may now receive federal funding pursuant to the Teacher Center Law, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 532, 90 Stat. 2081, 2154-55
(1976), which requires that the centers be governed by a board composed of teachers, administrators, and university representatives. Federal support for this innovation increases the promise of success for this cooperative venture of school boards,
PAN

university officials, and teachers. See McComb, So You're Interested in Teaching
Centers..., TODAY'S EDUCATION, April-May, 1978, at 69.

125. Inservice training is a method of furthering the professional development of
teachers through school-sponsored workshops. The need for inservice training has
been summarized in one comment as follows:
Learning is a lifelong process that does not end with certification; certification is only a minimal statement of acceptance. [It has been] suggest[ed]
that inservice education should be viewed as a means of narrowing the
differences between preservice and inservice education. "Learning to teach
and teaching to learn" better exemplifies the image of the professional
educator.
Burrello & Orbaugh, Reducing the DiscrepancyBetween the Known and the Unknown
in Inservice Education, 63 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 385, 386 (1982). It appears that the

success of inservice training depends directly on the degree of control teachers have
in the development of the program. See Andrew, Teacher-DirectedlnserviceEducation in Southern Indiana, 64 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 504 (1983); Sharma, Inservicingthe
Teachers, 63 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 403 (1982).
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vis-A-vis their employers. It will also create harmonious labor relations and promote continuity of governmental services. The purposes of PERA will not be vindicated by legislative action or judicial
decision, but by the actions of the parties themselves.
Darah S. Headley

